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Summary: Properly coordinating cooperation is relevant for resolving public good problems such 
as clean energy and environmental protection. However, little is known about how individuals can 
coordinate themselves for a certain level of cooperation in large populations of strangers. In a 
typical situation, a consensus-building process hardly succeeds due to lack of face and standing. 
The evolution of cooperation in this type of situation is studied using threshold public good games 
in which cooperation prevails when it is initially sufficient, or otherwise, it perishes. While 
punishment is a powerful tool to shape human behaviours, institutional punishment is often too 
costly to start with only a few contributors, which is another coordination problem. Here we show 
that whatever the initial conditions, reward funds based on voluntary contribution can evolve. The 
voluntary reward paves the way for effectively overcoming the coordination problem and efficiently 
transforms freeloaders to cooperators with a perceived small risk of collective failure. 
Keywords: public good game; evolution of cooperation; reward; punishment; coordination problem 
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1. Introduction 
Public goods, such as clean energy and environment protection, are building blocks of sustainable 
human societies, and those failures can have far-reaching effects. Private provision of public goods, 
however, poses issues where cooperation and coordination often do not succeed (e.g., [1]). First, 
voluntary cooperation to provide public goods suffers from self-interest behaviours. Exploiters can 
freeload on the efforts of others. In collective actions, proper coordination among individuals is 
usually required to attain a cooperation equilibrium. Otherwise, the advantage of freeloading leads 
individuals to end up being stacked with the non-cooperation equilibrium, which is a social trap. 
The coordination problem has been broadly studied by game theory, and its ubiquity is indicated by 
a variety of names: coordination game, assurance game, stag-hunt game, volunteer’s dilemma, or 
start-up problem [2–4]. Evolutionary-game models tackling sizeable groups often are built on 
public good games of cooperation and defection, but have generally resulted in a system that has a 
couple of equilibria (ones with no cooperation and certain-level cooperation) [5,6]. It has been a 
conundrum to develop a mechanism that allows populations independent of the initial conditions to 
evolve towards the cooperation equilibrium. Especially in a case where unanimous agreement is 
required for the public good, the situation is most stringent, with the only desirable initial condition 
being a state in which almost all cooperate. Theoretical and empirical analyses have clarified that 
prior communication [7] or social exchange situation [8] can facilitate selection of the cooperation 
equilibrium. Little is known, however, about how equilibrium selection can materialize from one-
shot anonymous interactions in large populations, in which such a consensus-building process is 
less likely to succeed. Previous studies showed that the higher the risk perception of collective 
failure, the higher the chance of coordinating cooperative actions [9–11]. Recent research has put 
forth that considering institutional punishment can further relax the initial conditions for 
establishing cooperation [12]. 
What happens if one considers reward, instead of punishment? Reward is one of the most-studied 
structural solutions for cooperation in sizeable groups, and better inspires cooperation [13,14]. 
While in real life there exist a huge array of subsidy systems for encouraging cooperative actions, 
here we turn to endogenous fundraising. (See [15] for formal rewards.) Early work revealed that 
replicator dynamics [16], whereby the more successful strategy spreads further, can lead to dynamic 
maintenance of cooperation in public good games with reward funds [17]. This model considered 
three strategies: to be (i) a cooperator or (ii) defector in the standard public goods game, or to be 
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(iii) a rewarder that contributes both to the public good and to the reward fund. Only those who 
contribute to the public good are invited into sharing the returns from the reward fund. The 
rewarders can spread even in a population of defectors, since these persons are excluded from the 
rewards. The fundraising itself, however, is voluntary and costly. This incentive scheme thus can 
easily be subverted by “second-order-freeloading” cooperators who contribute to the public good, 
but not to the rewards. In the next step, since contribution to the public good is also costly, 
cooperators will be displaced by “first-order-freeloading” defectors. This leads to a rock-scissors-
paper type of cyclical replacement among the three strategies. 
2. Model 
We extend public good games with reward funds [17] with a provision threshold [12], which can 
easily materialize a coordination situation. We consider infinitely large, well-mixed populations, 
from which n individuals with 2>n  are randomly sampled and form a gaming group. After one 
interaction, the group is dissolved. We assume the three strategies as before: both the rewarder and 
the cooperator are willing to contribute at a cost 0>c  to itself; the defector contributes nothing and 
thus incurs no cost. 100% of the public benefit is provided only if the number of contributors m 
( nm ≤≤0 ) in the group exceeds a threshold value k ( nk ≤≤1 ); or otherwise, part of the public 
benefit, discounted by a risk factor p ( 10 ≤≤ p ), is provided. However, the resulting benefit equally 
goes to every player, whatever she/he contributes. The individual benefit is given by pmB −=1)( , 
if km < , or otherwise, 1)( =mB  (figure 1). 
Next, we consider a voluntary reward fund for the threshold public good game. Beforehand, only 
the rewarders are willing to spend 0>′c  to the fund; then, after the game, the integrated fund 
multiplied by an interest rate 1>′r  will be shared equally among the m contributors (i rewarders 
and im −  cooperators) to the public good. The reward fund is thus a “club” good, excluding the 
defectors. In sum, a rewarder earns cmirccmB ′−′′+−)( , a cooperator, mirccmB ′′+−)( , and a 
defector, B(m). 
3. Results 
First, we look at the evolutionary outcomes without the rewarders. The step function B(m) with the 
intermediate threshold value k (figure 1) can lead to bistability of both no cooperation and a mixture 
of cooperation and defection for the sufficiently large risk factor p for nk <<1 , and for 1=k , with 
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only the mixed one [10,18]. Pure coordination between no and 100% cooperation occurs if and only 
if nk = , a case where avoiding the collective failure requires homogeneous cooperation among all 
participants. It holds for nk ≤<1  that the larger the risk p, the smaller (larger) the basin of 
attraction for a no (certain) cooperation equilibrium [10]. And in particular, to bring about 
bistability the critical risk factor p* takes its smallest value in the case of the unanimous agreement. 
The evolutionary outcomes change dramatically with the rewarders (figure 2a–e). The analytical 
investigation shows that if rewards are considered, the replicator dynamics leads the population to 
escape the non-cooperation equilibrium (D) and then evolve to the mixed equilibrium (X2) for 
nk <<1 , which for nk =  is 100% cooperation (C), once a bistable situation for the dynamics 
between cooperation and defection arises. For a certain level of rewards, first, no cooperation is 
negated by the spread of the pro-social, rewarding cooperators. The rewarders dominate the 
defectors as long as the most promising return of the fund )1( −′′ rc  is greater than c, a cost for the 
public good. Second, the temptation to withhold contribution to the reward pool tends to downgrade 
the pro-social efforts: the non-rewarding cooperators then subvert the population of the rewarders 
(R), and will spread over the population. This is common for whatever p and k, and leads to forming 
a roundabout to the side of the cooperation equilibrium C. In the absence of bistability for the 
threshold public good game, then the population state pulls back to the non-cooperation D’s side. 
The population can end up with complex dynamics, such as boundary orbits traveling the three 
homogenous state in rotation of D→ R→ C→D, or an interior limit cycle (figure 2b). Similar 
oscillatory dynamics for cooperation and rewards have been obtained in models more complicated 
by reputation system [14]. In the presence of the bistability (figure 2c–e), the resulting cooperative 
state X2 (for nk = , 100% cooperation C) is sustainable, even after the reward fund falls. Therefore, 
it is through the rise and fall of the reward fund that the coordination problem is completely 
resolved. 
4. Discussion 
Voluntary rewards can provide a powerful mechanism for overcoming coordination problems, 
without considering second-order punishment. This is an intriguing scenario that cannot easily be 
predicted from traditional models with voluntary punishment [16]. So far, for the evolution of 
cooperation with costly incentives, second-order freeloading has been a problematic ingredient, 
which should be defeated or suppressed [13,19,20]. The present model is in striking contrast to 
previous models and can complete 100% cooperation when second-order freeloading terminates the 
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voluntary rewarders. 
Collaborating results for transforming defectors into cooperators in coordination games have 
recently been obtained by considering optional participation [21,22] or through institutional 
punishment [12]. Optional participation can provide a simple but effective resolution for escaping 
the social trap [13,16]. In human societies, however, there are many issues to which people are 
inevitably required to be committed, such as nationality, religion, energy and environment. The 
present model focuses on such an unavoidable situation, and thus, players are forcibly admitted to 
games. 
Institutional punishment crucially influences the establishment of a stable level of cooperation, but 
in large groups it may face a coordination problem in itself [7,23]. That is, it would be difficult for a 
single punisher to make such a large impact that activates a sanctioning system that covers the 
whole group. What about punishing those who make no contribution to institutional punishment? 
This triggers an infinite regression to the question: who pays for (higher-order) punishment? In 
contrast, a reward fund can rise in response to a single volunteer and then spread in a population of 
defectors.  
All in all, it is not such a frustrating message that cooperation with reward funds is so powerful that 
it is more likely to start in the social trap than with institutional punishment. Voluntary rewarding is 
an efficient mechanism that allows for resolving coordination problems with minimal risk. 
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Figures and figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Step returns in the public good given by pmB −=1)(  for km < , or otherwise 1)( =mB . 
9	  
	  
 
Figure 2. Threshold public good games with reward funds. Three corners of the state space, the 
node D: 100% defectors, the node C: 100% cooperators, and the node R: 100% rewarders are trivial 
equilibria. (a) Risk zero ( 0=p ). The unique interior equilibrium is a centre Q, which is neutrally 
stable, and is surrounded by closed orbits, which fill over the interior state space. Boundary orbits 
form a heteroclinic cycle. (b, c) Partial agreement ( nk <<1 ). In (b), for a small risk p, there can 
exist a stable limit cycle (bold black curve) along which three strategies dynamically coexist. In (c), 
when p goes beyond a critical value p*, Q attains a point on the edge CD, from which then both 
unstable and stable equilibria sprout simultaneously; in particular, the stable one is a global 
attractor. (d, e) Unanimous agreement ( nk = ). When p increases beyond p*, the unstable 
equilibrium enters the edge CD at the node C, which then turns into a sink, in particular, a global 
attractor. Parameters are 5=n , 1.0=c , 1.0=′c , 5.2=′r , and for (b) and (c), 3=k . 
